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Help ILAO open opportunities for justiceThe Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (“IUIA”) allows for eligible individuals to receive benefits during periods of unemployment. 820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. The Illinois Department of Employment Security (“IDES”) administers programs for unemployment compensation and its Director is responsible for administration of the IUIA. See IDES's website. To be eligible for Unemployment Insurance benefits, a claimant must satisfy each of the following requirements:
A claimant must be unemployed, or working part-time and earning less than his UI weekly benefit amount ("WBA") 1 pursuant to Sections 239 and 500 of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act ("IUIA"). 820 ILCS 405/239, 820 ILCS 405/500. For benefit weeks between February 22, 2009 and December 7, 2010, the Federal Additional Compensation Program (FAC) provided a $25 weekly supplement to individuals eligible to receive unemployment benefits under federal or state law. However, the FAC has been discontinued for any benefit week beginning after December 7, 2010.
The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act requires that claimants have earnings at a certain level during at least two quarters of their “base period.” A base period includes a claimant’s first four of the last five completed calendar quarters. 820 ILCS 405/237.A., B. Thus, wages are not typically counted towards eligibility if they were earned in the quarter of the claimant’s application for benefits or the quarter prior to their application. Claimants must have earnings of at least $1,600 in their base period, have wages in at least two quarters to qualify, and must have earned at least $440 in a quarter included in their base period that was not the quarter in which wages paid were the highest. 820 ILCS 405/500.E. See Hlinka v. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 171 Ill. App. 3d 163 (1st Dist. 1988).
A claimant’s earnings must come from “covered employment” in order to be counted, which is explained further below. See Covered Employment.
For any benefit year beginning in January, 2008, if a claimant is ineligible using the traditional base period calculation, they may qualify under an alternate base period calculation if doing so results in eligibility. 820 ILCS 405/237.C. Specifically, the alternate base period will include the last four quarters immediately preceding the benefit year. Because a claimant’s WBA is determined by the wages he earned in his base period, some claimants may choose to delay applying until a subsequent quarter, if doing so will result in a base period with higher earnings. Note, however, that a claimant eligible for benefits under the traditional base period may not instead choose the alternate base period simply for the purpose of obtaining higher benefits. Instead, the alternate base period may only be used when a claimant is ineligible due to lack of sufficient earnings in the traditional base period.
When an employer does not report an employee’s wages, despite the requirement to do, a claimant may be denied all benefits (because IDES wrongly concludes the employee lacks sufficient base period wages to qualify) or may receive less than the full amount properly due (because a claimant’s WBA depends on the amount of their base period earnings). 820 ILCS 405/401, 820 ILCS 405/402 (see also Footnote 1).
Claimants receive a computer printout called a "finding," see 820 ILCS 405/701, which shows the wages reported by the claimant's employer(s) in each of the four quarters of the claimant's base period and the resulting WBA and dependent's allowance, if any. If the reported wages are incorrect, the claimant has 30 days to appeal the finding. 820 ILCS 405/800. A claimant who does so should compile any documents that can confirm his receipt of the wages including, wage stubs, W-2 forms or bank account statements showing regular deposits. IDES must consider any such evidence (including the claimant's sworn statement that he received wages) and determine whether the claimant did, in fact, receive the additional wages without first chasing the employer to recover the contributions due. Burtton v. Johnson, 538 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1976). If the employer is still a viable entity, IDES can subpoena its records to confirm the payment of wages 2 .
A claimant must have earned the base period wages on which the claim depends while he was either a United States citizen, a lawful permanent resident or "permanently residing in the United States under color of law" ("PRUCOL"). 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14), 820 ILCS 405/614. The problem cases concern concern whether a claimant meets the definition of “PRUCOL,” which can be imprecise.
When INS knows of a person's presence in the U.S., but takes no affirmative steps to deport, the issue is less clear. The United States Department of Labor takes the position that INS inaction does not mean a person has "color of law" status. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter ("UIPL") No. 1-86, 51 Fed. Reg. 29713 (Aug. 20, 1986). But Castillo and other cases have brought the effect of this letter into question. See, e.g., Brambila v. Bd. of Review, 124 N.J. 425, 591 A.2d 605 (1991); Cruz v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1985); St. Francis Hosp. v. D'Elia, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) aff'd 440 N.Y.S.2d 185, 422 N.E.2d 830 (1981).
An alien does not need INS work authorization during his base period to fulfill the requirements of 820 ILCS 405/614 5 . See Antillon, 688 P.2d at 457-59; Sandoval v. Colo. Div. of Emp't, 757 P.2d 1105, 11-8 (Colo. 1988); Rubio, 674 P.2d at 1203. But a grant of work authorization during that period is sufficient to establish eligibility. See, UIPL No. 1-86, 51 Fed. Reg. at 29715; Gillar v. Emp't Div., 717 P.2d 131, 136 (Or. 1986); Bushehri v. Indus. Claim Appeal Office, 749 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1987).
Aliens who have been granted lawful temporary resident status pursuant to an amnesty application or amnesty itself, are eligible as of November 6, 1986, the effective date of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Castillo v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 165, 594 N.E.2d 323 (1992).
IDES's regulations on alien eligibility are at 56 Ill. Adm. Code §§ 2905.1-2905.40. Be careful, however, because these regulations were overruled in certain respects.
Both federal and state law assure that "no determination by the State agency that compensation to [an] individual is not payable because of his alien status shall be made except upon a preponderance of the evidence." 26 U.S.C. 3304(a)(14)(C), 820 ILCS 405/614.B. Thus, IDES bears the burden of proving that an alien is not entitled to benefits because of his status. Velasquez v. Secretary of Dept. of HHS, 581 F. Supp. 16, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Cruz v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Mass. 1985). IDES may, therefore, request verification of documents from INS, but it cannot withhold benefits pending INS verification unless a claims adjudicator decides that the documentation presented by the claimant was altered or the claimant admits that he is not legally in the U.S. 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2905.20.
A claimant's base period wages must have been earned from an employer that is covered by (i.e., not exempt under) the Act. 820 ILCS 405/204-235.
But the statute's definition of "independent contractor" under the IUIA is very narrow and those who claim the advantage of this provision bear the burden of proving that they did not hire the claimant as an employee. That is, an employer seeking this exemption has the burden of proving that:
(1) the worker is free from control or direction over the performance of services;
(2) the services are performed outside the usual course or place of the employer's business; and
(3) the worker is engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
The Illinois Administrative Code contains guidance for this determination, and a list of factors relevant to the determination of independent contractor status. 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2732.200. Further, the following is a list of cases relevant to this determination:
See Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 201 Ill. 2d 351, 776 N.E.2d 166 (2002) (finding carpet installers to be independent contractors and carpet measurers to be employees since employee determination made on basis of the parties’ actual relationship and not the parties’ designation); AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 198 Ill. 2d 380, 763 N.E.2d 272 (2001) (messengers not independent contractors); Jack Bradley, Inc. v. IDES, 146 Ill. 2d 61, 585 N.E.2d 123 (1991) (food demonstrators not independent contractors); Bennett v. IDES, 175 Ill. App. 3d 793, 530 N.E.2d 541 (2d Dist. 1988) (drywall installers not independent contractors); Legal Process Service, Inc. v. Ward, 165 Ill. App. 3d 83, 518 N.E. 2d 768 (2d Dist. 1988) (legal process servers not independent contractors); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. IDOL, 186 Ill. App. 3d 493, 542 N.E.2d 538 (2d Dist. 1989) (insurance agent not independent contractor); O'Hare-Midway Limousine Service v. Baker, 232 Ill. App. 3d 108, 596 N.E.2d 795 (1st Dist. 1992) (limousine chauffeurs not independent contractors); National Data Services of Chicago, Inc. v. Director of Employment Sec., 319 Ill. App. 3d 25, 746 N.E.2d 40 (2d Dist. 2001) (home data entry workers not independent contractors); Chicago Messenger Service v. Jordan, 356 Ill. App. 3d 101, 825 N.E.2d 315 (1st Dist. 2005) (couriers not independent contractors); SMRJ, Inc. v. Russell, 378 Ill. App. 3d 563, 884 N.E.2d 1152 (1st Dist. 2007) (laborers referred by service not independent contractors); Veterans Messenger Service, Inc. v. Jordan, 393 Ill. App. 3d 715, 913 N.E.2d 1094 (1st Dist. 2009) (couriers not independent contractors), appeal denied, 234 Ill. 2d 554 (2009); Emergency Treatment, S.C. v. Department of Employment Sec., 394 Ill. App. 3d 893, 917 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 2009) (physicians, scheduler and auditor hired by emergency room staffing service not independent contractors), appeal denied, 235 Ill. 2d 587 (2010). National Data Services of Chicago, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 27 (noting home workers who testified considered themselves to be independent contractors, but nonetheless holding they were not). The Illinois Administrative Code contains guidance for this determination, and a list of factors relevant to the determination of independent contractor status. 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2732.200.
Claimants must register for work with the job service, be actively seeking work, be able to work, and be available for work. These are commonly referred to as the "A&A" requirements. 820 ILCS 405/500. The claimant has the burden on A&A issues. Yadro v. Bowling, 91 Ill. App. 3d 889, 414 N.E.2d 1244 (1st Dist. 1980).
Claimants are presumed to be “able” to work unless there is a question of health factors that might disable a claimant 7 .
In addition, a claimant may be considered not “able” to work if they have a legal inability to work based on their immigration status. Even before the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), which first made it unlawful to employ aliens without INS work authorization, some courts held that, without such authorization, a claimant is unable to work because "legal inability to work is as disqualifying as physical inability to work." Pinilla v. Bd. of Review, 155 N.J. Super. 307, 311, 382 A.2d 921 (1978); see also Claim of Diamond, 210 A.D.2d 835, 620 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y.A.D. 3d Dept. 1994); Gutierrez v. Employment Development Department, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1791 (1993); Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 1–86, 51 Fed. Reg. 29713–01, at 4 (Department Letter) ("Under the laws of all States, a claimant must be 'able and available' to work to be eligible for unemployment compensation. In addition to meeting other State availability requirements, an alien must be legally authorized to work in the United States to be considered 'available for work.'"); but see Carillo v. Emp. Div., 744 P.2d 1304 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Flores v. Dept. of Jobs and Training, 411 N.W.2d 499 (Minn. 1987); Vespremi v. Giles, 427 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
The "availability" and "actively seeking work" components of Section 500.C. both "depend on the facts and circumstances in each case." Mohler v. IDOL, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1951); Brown v. Bd. of Review, 8 Ill. App. 3d 19, 289 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1st Dist. 1972). A claimant satisfies these requirements when he "is ready and willing to accept suitable work at a point where there is an available labor market, which work he does not have good cause to refuse." Id.; see also Moss v. Department of Employment Sec., 357 Ill. App. 3d 980, 830 N.E.2d 663 (1st Dist. 2005); Miller v. IDES, 245 Ill. App. 3d 520, 615 N.E.2d 35 (4th Dist. 1993). The focus of the inquiry is on the claimant's "mental attitude" as to whether he is "genuinely attached to the labor market and desires employment" as demonstrated by evidence that the worker has made "a reasonable attempt to find work and will not wait for a job to seek him out." Mohler, 97 N.E.2d at 764.
The requirements do not demand all-encompassing efforts to seek work. Reasonable ones will suffice. Galarza v. IDOL, 167 Ill. App. 3d 163, 520 N.E.2d 672 (2nd Dist. 1988); Mohler, 97 N.E.2d at 764. For example, looking for part-time work is acceptable if there is a market for such work and the claimant is qualified by experience and training for that work. Rosenbaum v. Johnson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 657, 377 N.E.2d 258 (1st Dist. 1978). Similarly, a claimant who is laid off temporarily may seek temporary rather than permanent work 8 . See Galarza, 520 N.E.2d 672; Mohler, 97 N.E.2d at 764.
Brown v. Bd of Review, 8 Ill. App. 3d at 22; see also Ferretti v. IDOL, 115 Ill. 2d 347, 506 N.E.2d 560 (1987) (approving job inquiries to friends and informal contacts, and driving around a factory district looking for job openings sufficient to fulfill the requirments of the Act).
Though seasonal workers are not generally barred from receiving benefits 10 , they must make reasonable attempts to find work in the "off" season. Kelley v. IDOL, 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 513 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1987).
In addition, claimants who leave one locality to move to another "where opportunities to work are less favorable than those in the locality he has left" are presumed to be unavailable for work. 820 ILCS 405/500.C.3. See Yadro v. Bowling, 91 Ill. App. 3d 889, 414 N.E.2d 1244 (1st Dist. 1980).
Similarly claimants whose "principal occupation is that of a student in attendance at, or on vacation from, a public or private school" are presumed to be unavailable. 820 ILCS 405/500.C.4; see Moss v. Department of Employment Sec., 357 Ill. App. 3d 980, 830 N.E.2d 663 (1st Dist. 2005); Miller v. IDES, 245 Ill. App. 3d 520, 615 N.E.2d 740 (4th Dist. 1993); James v. IDOL, 119 Ill. App. 3d 524, 456 N.E.2d 879 (2d Dist. 1983). "A claimant who is going to school can be available for a full-time job at the same time, but the circumstances of each case must be considered by the Department before finding that someone's principal occupation is that of a student." Moss, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 987. A person maintaining even a full-time academic course load has been considered not to be in the "principal occupation" of a student where her work history and testimony indicated her course schedule would not unduly restrict her work schedule. See Digest of Adjudication Precedents ("Digest") AA § 40.05, ABR-87-7121/12-30-87. Also, a college student who was employed as a temporary full-time bus driver under the CTA's "summer student program," whereby college students are hired on a temporary basis during the summer, and who decided not to return to school for the fall term was deemed "available for work" when she applied for unemployment benefits in the fall. Chicago Transit Authority v. Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 773, 664 N.E.2d 639 (1st Dist. 1995).
"[T]he longer the claimant has been out of work, the more willing he must be to perform different tasks, travel farther, and accept lower pay." Crocker v. IDOL, 121 Ill. App. 3d 185, 459 N.E.2d 332 (2d Dist. 1984). This principle of lowering expectations is especially important in adjudicating A&A issues in extended benefit claims. See Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1988). Extended benefits ("EB") are additional weeks of benefits that "trigger on" during periods of national recession. See 820 ILCS 405/409 and the Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a)(11) and note, Pub. L. 91-373 (as amended). IDES requires an additional work search form, establishing, inter alia, a "sustained and systematic" effort to find work, to be submitted to establish eligibility for EB.
The lowering expectations principle is important in EB cases because EB is, by definition, paid to claimants who have been unemployed for a longer time, and because, unlike regular benefits, if a claimant is denied EB for any one week, he is thereby denied all future weeks. Compare, Clark v. Bd. of Review, 126 Ill. App. 3d 559, 467 N.E.2d 950 (1st Dist. 1984) with DiModica v. IDES, 164 Ill. App. 3d 445, 517 N.E.2d 1197 (2d Dist.1987). During periods in which EB is "on," however, IDES must notify claimants of the work search requirements they are expected to meet. Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1988).
A claimant may draw benefits during one "benefit year" 11 for the lesser of 26 weeks times his/her wba plus dependents' allowances, if any, or until (s)he is paid benefits equal to the total wages paid to the claimant during his/her base period. 12 , 820 ILCS 405/403. Once a claimant has drawn the maximum amount of benefits during one benefit year, (s)he cannot draw more weeks of regular UI until (s)he begins a new benefit year 13 .
Since June, 2008, claimants who exhausted their state benefits have been able to obtain Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC). 13.5 EUC works by providing benefits in four successive "tiers" of 20, 14, 13 and 6 weeks each. See Pub. L. No. 110-252, Title IV, §§ 4002(d)-(f), 122 Stat. 2353 (2008), as amended 13.5 . The first two tiers are available in any state, while the third and fourth tiers are only available in states with unemployment rates meeting certain minimum levels. Illinois currently meets the minimum level of unemployment for all the tiers, so that claimants in Illinois may be eligible for 53 total additional weeks of benefits though EUC. However, the EUC program was extended only to January 1, 2014, and was not available as of November 2014.
Remember that the wages a claimant earned during both the calendar quarter in which (s)he files a claim, and the preceding calendar quarter, are not considered in determining whether the claimant qualifies for benefits because those wages are not in the claimant's "base period." (But if omitting the preceding completed calendar quarter renders the claimant completely ineligible, it may be counted in an alternate "base period.") (See Base Period Earnings.) Some claimants using the traditional base period could file a second claim just after the end of their first benefit year, using wages from the quarters that were disregarded when they first filed because they fell in the original filing quarter and the quarter previous thereto. And, absent any statutory limitation, if those wages were enough to qualify again, the claimant could begin to draw regular benefits again during a second benefit year without working again after the initial layoff 14 . But Section 607 of the IUIA, 820 ILCS 405/607, requires that, to qualify for benefits again after a claimant's first benefit year has expired, a claimant must have worked again, subsequent to the beginning of the prior benefit year, and earned at least 3 times his/her wba.
A claimant who meets all the eligibility requirements described in Section 1 infra will not receive benefits if (s)he is disqualified for one of the following reasons:
See also below for Disqualifying Income.
Pursuant to 820 ILCS 405/602.A, an individual who is discharged for misconduct in connection with work is disqualified unless he becomes reemployed and has had earnings equal to or in excess of his current weekly benefit amount in each of four calendar weeks.
"Misconduct" is defined in Section 602 of the IUIA as the deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule or policy of the employing unit, governing the individual's behavior in performance of his work, provided such violation has harmed the employing unit or other employees or has been repeated by the individual despite a warning or other explicit instruction from the employing unit. 820 ILCS 405/602.A.
Although the statute requires a rule or "policy," the Illinois Appellate Court, in a series of cases, has not required that the rule or policy be written or even articulated in circumstances where the behavior violates a policy which is self-evident such as sexual harassment, Caterpillar Inc. v. IDES, 313 Ill. App. 3d 645 (2d Dist. 2000), leaving a vulgar and abusive message on a coworker's home voice mail, Manning v. Department of Employment Sec., 365 Ill. App. 3d 553, 850 N.E.2d 244 (1st Dist. 2006); stealing, Ray v. IDES, 244 Ill. App. 3d 233, 614 N.E.2d 196 (1st Dist. 1993); or fighting, Bandemer v. IDES, 204 Ill. App. 3d 192, 562 N.E.2d 6, 7 (1st Dist. 1990). But proof of a policy is required in situations where an employee would not be aware that certain conduct is proscribed. Zuaznabar v. Bd. of Review, 257 Ill. App. 3d 354, 628 N.E.2d 986 (1st Dist. 1993); Farmers Ins. Bank v. IDES, 216 Ill. App. 3d 633, 576 N.E.2d 532 (3d Dist. 1990); Adams v. Ward, 206 Ill. App. 3d 719, 565 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1990); compare Oleszczuk v. Department of Employment Sec., 336 Ill. App. 3d 46, 782 N.E.2d 808 (1st Dist. 2002) (noting that while a rule may reasonably require employees directed to attend a training session to "attend and show evidence of having learned something," and that "such a rule is so obvious it need not be stated," where the employer merely disputed "how much, or how well" the employee had learned, no rule had been violated).
The employer's failure to follow its own disciplinary policies in discharging an employee for misconduct does not preclude denial of unemployment benefits. DeBois v. IDES, 274 Ill. App. 3d 660, 653 N.E.2d 1336 (1st Dist. 1995).
What constitutes a discharge: The question occasionally arises as to whether a work separation is a discharge. Refusal to put an employee on the schedule is tantamount to a discharge. Grigoleit Company v. IDES, 282 Ill. App. 3d 64,70 (4th Dist. 1996). Likewise refusal to allow an employee to return from an approved leave of absence is the functional equivalent of a discharge. Jones v. IDES, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1st Dist. 1995). A suspension or involuntary unpaid leave of absence of more than one week is treated as a discharge. See Mattson v. IDOL, 118 Ill. App. 3d 724, 455 N.E.2d 278 (1983); Overstreet v. IDOL, 168 Ill. App. 3d 24, 522 N.E.2d 185, 187 (1st Dist. 1988); see generally Digest, MC § 135, VL § 135.
Proximate or last act: However, a finding of deliberate and willful misconduct does not require a showing of a proximate or last act which led to the discharge. "A section 602A misconduct finding can be premised on either a particular incident of a rule's violation that triggered the employee's discharge, or the employee's cumulative rules violation taken as a whole." See Katten, Muchin & Zavis v. IDES, 279 Ill. App. 3d 794, 665 N.E.2d 503 (1st Dist. 1996) (claimant's compliance with the employer's rules immediately before his discharge did not foreclose a finding of misconduct based on the claimant's cumulative record of violating rules). Note, however, that the employer must offer evidence of such cumulative misconduct to rely upon it. See Wrobel v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 344 Ill. App. 3d 533, 801 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 2003) (distinguishing Katten, Muchin where there was no evidence that past infractions were willful and not the result of negligence).
Alcohol or drug use: Alcohol or drug use either on the job or such that the employee is impaired at work constitutes misconduct. See Jackson v. Board of Review, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879 (1985) (applying former definition of misconduct); Glasper v. Bd. of Review, 218 Ill. App. 3d 347, 578 N.E.2d 254 (1st Dist. 1991); Overstreet v. IDES, 168 Ill. App. 3d 24, 522 N.E.2d l185 (1st Dist. 1988); Neville v. Bd. of Review, 143 Ill. App. 3d 548, 494 N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1986); Profice v. Bd. of Review of Illinois, 135 Ill. App. 3d 254, 481 N.E.2d 1229 (1st Dist. 1985); Mattson v. IDOL, 118 Ill. App. 3d 724, 455 N.E.2d 278 (4th Dist. 1983).
Also, drug or alcohol use that neither occurs on the job nor affects one's work constitutes misconduct if a urine or blood test taken at work reveals trace amounts of the drugs and the presence of drugs violates an employer rule, particularly when there are safety considerations at work. McAllister v. Bd. of Review, 263 Ill. App. 3d 207, 635 N.E.2d 596 (1st Dist. 1994) (CTA bus driver). An Illinois court has held that failing to pass drug tests on two occasions, despite a warning, constitutes misconduct whether there are safety considerations or not. Robinson v. IDES, 264 Ill. App. 3d 659, 637 N.E.2d 631 (1st Dist. 1994) 15 .
Perhaps the most valuable argument in cases involving drug or alcohol use is that the claimant's conduct was not deliberate because (s)he is alcoholic or drug dependent. See Menneweather v. Bd. of Review, 249 Ill. App. 3d 980, 621 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1992). But this argument has been used most effectively when the claimant is absent or tardy because of alcohol or drug use, see id., not when the claimant uses the substance at work or comes to the job under the influence. Also, the Claimant must admit to being alcohol or drug dependent (something that often conflicts with the denial associated with any such illness) and submit medical proof of that fact and that the illness caused the conduct in question. Id.
Insubordination: Insubordination is misconduct. See Greenlaw v. IDES, 299 Ill. App. 3d 446 (1st Dist. 1998); Nichols v. IDES, 218 Ill. App. 3d 803, 578 N.E.2d 1121 (1st Dist. 1991); Carroll v. Bd. of Review, 132 Ill. App. 3d 686, 477 N.E.2d 800 (2d Dist. 1985); Walthall v. IDOL, 146 Ill. App. 3d 701, 497 N.E.2d 782 (1st Dist. 1986); Stovall v. IDES, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 640 N.E.2d 299 (1st Dist. 1994). But merely being argumentative in a private conversation with a supervisor, even in a loud voice, is not misconduct. See Czajka v. Department of Employment Sec., 387 Ill. App. 3d 168 (1st Dist. 2008). A "single flurry of temper between a worker and a supervisor," without threats or abusive language, does not suffice to constitute misconduct. Id.; see also Oleszczuk v. Department of Employment Sec., 336 Ill. App. 3d 46, 52 (1st Dist. 2002); Sheff v. Bd. of Review, 128 Ill. App. 3d 347, 470 N.E.2d 1044 (5th Dist. 1984); Gee v. Bd. of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 889, 483 N.E.2d 1025 (1st Dist. 1985). However, directing an abusive expletive at a supervisor may be misconduct even if the employee does not use explicitly profane language. See Greenlaw v. IDES, 299 Ill. App. 3d 446 (1st Dist. 1998) (employee's use of expression "kiss my grits" held to be misconduct). If an employee refuses an employer request to stay overtime to discuss a problem because the employer does not pay overtime pay as required by the FLSA, (s)he has not committed "misconduct." Crowley v. IDES, 190 Ill. App. 3d 900, 546 N.E.2d 1042 (2d Dist. 1989).
Negligence: Similarly, mere negligence, even repetitively, or poor judgment is not misconduct. See Wrobel v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 344 Ill. App. 3d 533, 801 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 2003); Pesce v. Bd. of Review, 161 Ill. App. 3d 879, 515 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1987); Siler v. IDES, 192 Ill. App. 3d 921, 549 N.E.2d 760 (1st Dist. 1989); Crowley v. IDES, 190 Ill. App. 3d 900, 546 N.E.2d 1042 (2d Dist. 1989). But see Perto v. Bd. of Review, 274 Ill. App. 3d 485, 654 N.E.2d 232 (2d Dist. 1995) (claimant's failure to perform weekly commodity counts was willful misconduct despite cash register malfunction because claimant failed to report the malfunction to his supervisor and should have continued the counts manually). However, be aware that many referees function under the reasoning that if an action was “within an employee’s ability to control,” and it violates an employer’s reasonable rule, then it is willful misconduct. See, e.g., Wrobel, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 538 (reversing denial of benefits on this ground, where claimant was late because he had overslept); compare Livingston v. Department of Employment Sec., 375 Ill. App. 3d 710, 873 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist. 2007) (employee's inappropriate touching of elderly nursing home resident's face in effort to subdue her constituted misconduct, despite employee's argument that the incident constituted mere poor judgment).
Absence or tardiness: Absence or tardiness is not misconduct if the claimant has a good reason for the attendance problem and either notifies the employer, or has a good reason for not doing so. Wright v. IDOL, 166 Ill. App. 3d 438, 519 N.E.2d 1054 (1st Dist. 1987); London v. IDES, 177 Ill. App. 3d 276, 532 N.E.2d 294 (1st Dist. 1988); Garner v. IDES, 269 Ill. App. 3d 370, 646 N.E.2d 3 (2d Dist. 1995); Wrobel v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 344 Ill. App. 3d 533, 801 N.E.2d 29 (1st Dist. 2003); Abbott Industries, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., --- N.E.2d ----, 2011 WL 2517034 (2d Dist. June 20, 2011). But when the claimant could have avoided being absent or tardy, or fails to notify the employer when (s)he could have done so, that is misconduct. See, e.g., Wilson v. IDES, 196 Ill. App. 3d 711, 554 N.E.2d 1006 (1st Dist. 1990); Thomas v. Ward, 211 Ill. App. 3d 624, 570 N.E.2d 477 (1st Dist. 1990); Gregory v. Bernardi, 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 465 N.E.2d 1052 (2d Dist. 1984); Robinson v. IDOL, 118 Ill. App. 3d 986, 455 N.E.2d 567 (3d Dist. 1983); Bandemer v. IDES, 204 Ill. App. 3d 192, 562 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1990); Medvid v. IDES, 186 Ill. App. 3d 747, 542 N.E.2d 852 (1st Dist. 1989); Bocehnek v. IDES, 169 Ill. App. 3d 507, 525 N.E.2d 893 (1st Dist. 1988). However, falsifying time sheets constitutes willful misconduct where claimant was notified of employer's reasonable rule regarding falsifying time sheets. DeBois v. IDES, 274 Ill. App. 3d 660, 653 N.E.2d 1336 (1st Dist. 1995).
Falling asleep at work: Falling asleep at work is not misconduct if doing so was inadvertent (e.g., nodding off at a meeting) as opposed to purposeful (e.g., going to a little-used area of the workplace in order to take a nap). Compare Washington v. Bd. of Review, 211 Ill. App. 3d 663, 570 N.E.2d 566 (1991). (claimant secretary who took aspirin for headache and fell asleep for 30 minutes did not commit misconduct), with Odie v. Department of Employment Sec., 377 Ill. App. 3d 710, 881 N.E.2d 358 (1st Dist. 2007) (distinguishing Washington where claimant's testimony that falling asleep was inadvertent was belied by her reaction to being woken up, which failed to show "alarm or embarrassment," and where her duties, monitoring 20 to 30 nursing home residents who required skilled nursing care, required her to be alert).
Known rule: For the claimant's action to be "deliberate and willfull," the rule that (s)he violated must be known. See Farmers Ins. Bank v. IDES, 216 Ill. App. 3d 633, 576 N.E.2d 532 (3d Dist. 1990); Adams v. Ward, 206 Ill. App. 3d 719, 565 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1990); Lachenmeyer v. Didrickson, 263 Ill. App. 3d 382, 636 N.E.2d 503 (4th Dist. 1994). Also, the rule violated must be a reasonable rule or policy governing the employee's work performance. Perto v. Bd. of Review, 274 Ill. App. 3d 485, 654 N.E.2d 232, (2d Dist. 1995). A rule is not "reasonable" unless it provides guidelines that are or should be known by employee. Garner v. IDES, 269 Ill. App. 3d 370, 646 N.E.2d 3 (2d Dist. 1995) (employer's rule about calling in was not reasonable where claimant's absence related to the employer's admitted chronic nonpayment of wages). The existence of a reasonable rule or policy violated by claimant does not have to be proven by direct evidence but can be found to exist through some common sense realization that certain behavior intentionally and substantially disregards the employer's interest. Stovall v. IDES, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 640 N.E.2d 299 (1st Dist. 1994).
The claimant must have either harmed the employer or another employee or repeated his conduct after notice that it was wrong. See Kiefer v. IDES, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1057 (1st Dist. 1994); Adams v. Ward, 206 Ill. App. 3d 719, 565 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1990); Zuaznabar v. Bd. of Review, 257 Ill. App. 3d 354, 628 N.E.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Dist. 1993). The "harm" element requires care because courts may view conduct that costs the employer only a little bit as too de minimis to constitute harm. See e.g., Bandemer v. Department of Employment Sec., 204 Ill. App. 3d 192, 562 N.E.2d 6 (1st Dist. 1990) (late opening of store caused the employer sufficient harm to constitute misconduct, because potential customers unable to shop); Ray v. IDES, 244 Ill. App. 3d 233, 614 N.E.2d 196 (1st Dist. 1993) (pilfering a few inexpensive items is misconduct). Harm to the morale of other employees has been held to constitute the requisite harm. See Manning v. Department of Employment Sec., 365 Ill. App. 3d 553, 850 N.E.2d 244 (1st Dist. 2006); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec., 313 Ill. App. 3d 645, 730 N.E.2d 497 (2d Dist. 2000) (sexual harassment). The court has even characterized the "loss of trust" placed in an employee and the expense of training a replacement as "harm." See Phistry v. Department of Employment Sec., 405 Ill. App. 3d 604, 939 N.E.2d 577 (1st Dist. 2010). However, that case also involved financial harm caused by the employee's personal use of office credit cards. See id. Presumably, mere "loss of trust," without at least some other harm, should not suffice; otherwise the element of harm is effectively negated altogether.
The courts have been split on the question of whether actual harm, as opposed to potential harm, must be shown. Compare Czajka v. Department of Employment Sec., 387 Ill. App. 3d 168, 901 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist. 2008) (noting split of authority but finding that where there was no evidence that church employee's continuing protest of video shown by church "had any modicum of success," harm element not met); Adams v. Ward, 206 Ill. App. 3d 719, 565 N.E.2d 53 (1st Dist. 1990) (where employee uniforms wrongly thrown away were retrieved, no harm shown); Kiefer, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1061-62 (unauthorized insurance sales did not cause harm), and Zuaznabar (negligent driving and unauthorized stops did not cause harm), with Hurst v. Department of Employment Sec., 393 Ill. App. 3d 323, 913 N.E.2d 1067 (1st Dist. 2009) (referring to "weight of authority" permitting harm to be merely potential, and finding harm where employee failed to report arrest for driving while intoxicated, which impeded employer's ability to determine that license was revoked and could have exposed it to liability); Livingston v. Department of Employment Sec., 375 Ill. App. 3d 710, 717-18, 873 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist. 2007) (slapping nursing home resident caused actual and potential harm); Manning, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 557-58 (hostile and abusive voice mail to coworker caused potential harm to work environment); Greenlaw v. Department of Employment Sec., 299 Ill. App. 3d 446, 701 N.E.2d 175 (1st Dist. 1998) (abusive language directed at supervisors potentially harmful to business); Bandemer, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 195 (failure to open store caused potential harm to business); Brodde v. Didrickson, 269 Ill. App. 3d 309, 645 N.E.2d 990 (1st Dist. 1995) (violation of safety rules constituted potential harm); Winklmeier v. Board of Review, 115 Ill. App. 3d 154, 450 N.E.2d 353 (5th Dist. 1983) (filing false medical claims caused potential harm, as employer was exposed to greater insurance costs). The Livingston court discussed the split of authority and attempted to reconcile some of the cases, determining there was "actual and potential harm" where the potential harm was not remote, in that it exposed the nursing home to liability and reputational damage, and where the conduct at issue was deliberate. Livingston, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 717-18.
The courts are also divided on the similar question of whether the employer must present evidence on the harm/potential harm issue or whether the existence of either actual or potential harm can be presumed from the circumstances. In a Second District case the court held that the employer must articulate and prove either actual or potential harm. Garner v. IDES, 269 Ill. App. 3d 370, 646 N.E.2d 3 (2d Dist. 1995) (claimant failed to call in to report his absence from work in violation of the employer's rule because employer repeatedly failed to pay him on time). The Court in Garner reversed a finding of misconduct because the record contained no evidence of harm of any kind, such as evidence that claimant's absence resulted in uncompleted work, loss of productivity, complaints from clientele or loss of business. It further held that there was no misconduct because the record contained no evidence that claimant was ever explicitly and unambiguously warned that his absence while waiting for his paycheck would not be tolerated, although claimant's supervisor had counseled him that "he was only hurting himself and his absenteeism would reflect on his employment record."
IDES has promulgated a regulation to clarify the requirements of "harm," containing a list of examples. See 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.25.
If an employee violates a rule that does not govern the behavior of the employee in performance of work, this is not misconduct, even though the employer may feel the conduct is contrary to its interests. Thus, some acts, though unquestionably wrongful, do not disqualify a claimant because they are not "connected with work." Caterpillar Inc. v. Fehrenbacher, 286 Ill. App. 3d 614 (2d Dist. 1997) (employee who placed a sign in his truck window reading “scab” did not commit misconduct connected with work). Compare Hurst v. Department of Employment Sec., 393 Ill. App. 3d 323, 913 N.E.2d 1067 (1st Dist. 2009) (where employer had a rule requiring employees to report all arrests, employee failed to report DUI arrest immediately, and valid license was requirement of employee's work, misconduct considered to be connected with work, even though conduct and arrest occurred outside of work); Czajka v. Department of Employment Sec., 387 Ill. App. 3d 168, 901 N.E.2d 436 (1st Dist. 2008) (that some conduct occurred off duty or outside employer's property did not "negate a nexus" between conduct and employer's rule); Manning v. Department of Employment Sec., 365 Ill. App. 3d 553, 850 N.E.2d 244 (1st Dist. 2006) (vulgar and hostile message left outside of work hours and off-site on co-worker's home voicemail considered to be sufficiently connected to work, where dispute started on-site and message referred to work-related matters).
Some courts treat off-duty drug use that does not impair the claimant's work ability as unconnected with work and, therefore, not disqualifying. See National Gypsum Co. v. State Emp. Sec. Bd. of Rev., 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 787 (1989); Total Engineered Maintenance v. ESD, 1988 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 8968 at 50, 608 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1987); Weyhaeser v. Emp. Div., 105 Or.App. 233, 804 P.2d 1183 (1991); Veneer v. Emp. Div., 105 Or.App. 198, 804 P.2d 1174 (1990); Marine Drilling Co. v. Whitfield, 535 So.2d 1253 (La.App. 1988); Glide Lumber Products Co. v. Emp. Div., 86 Or.App. 669, 741 P.2d 907 (1987); Silverton Forest Products Co. v. Emp. Div., 86 Or.App. 684, 741 P.2d 915 (1987). While it may seem that this argument would be particularly strong in Illinois, since the definition of misconduct in the IUIA requires that the claimant violate a rule that "govern[s] the individual's behavior in performance of his work," Illinois state courts have routinely denied such claims. See e.g., Robinson v. IDES, 264 Ill. App. 3d 659, 637 N.E.2d 631 (1st Dist. 1994); MacAllister v. Bd. of Review, 263 Ill. App. 3d 207, 635 N.E.2d 596 (1st Dist. 1994).
As a general rule, the burden of proving misconduct is on the employer. See, e.g., Adams v. Ward, 565 N.E.2d at 57 ("First, an employer must show the former employee violated a reasonable company rule."); Zuaznabar v. Bd. of Review, 257 Ill. App. 3d 354, 628 N.E.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Dist. 1993); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955, 959 (Id. 1980) see generally 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 71, (2011). In practice, however, the burden of proof switches depending on the relative knowledge of the parties.
For example, in cases involving acts which would otherwise be misconduct, but which were not deliberate and willfull because the claimant is an alcoholic (see Specific Types of Conduct), the claimant will be required to prove the fact of the alcoholism and the causative link between that condition and the conduct in question (e.g., being tardy). See Menneweather v. Bd. of Review, 249 Ill. App. 3d 980, 621 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1992). Similarly, a claimant who says that he got permission from a supervisor to do something that would otherwise violate the employer's rule has the burden of proving that fact.
Section 602.B of the IUIA is a special misconduct provision for claimants who are discharged because of the commission of a felony or theft in connection with work, for which the employer was in no way responsible 820 ILCS 405/602.B. Section 602.B disqualifies a claimant not just until he earns four times his WBA (as is the case in simple "misconduct" disqualifications) but until he earns the full $1600/$440 base period earnings necessary to file a "valid" claim. 16 , see Base Period Earnings.
Section 602.B applies when an individual has admitted committing the crime (to IDES or in a written statement) 17 or commission of the act has resulted in a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. But, contrary to the language in the statute, IDES cannot hold a UI claim in abeyance pending disposition of criminal adjudication because to do so violates 42 U.S.C. 503(a)(1). See Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225 (7th Dist. 1982). Instead, IDES must promptly hold a hearing and determine whether the claimant committed the act in question even if the criminal trial has not yet been completed.
In practice, therefore, felony/theft cases create a somewhat unique problem because the claimant will be asked to testify at the UI hearing before he decides whether to do so in the criminal case. If he does testify in the UI hearing, he arguably waives his Fifth Amendment right to silence at the later criminal case. See Reed v. State, 523 So.2d 62 (Miss. 1990) 18 . Alternatively, the claimant may suffer an inference from his refusal to testify because, while the Fifth Amendment protects a claimant from testifying in a UI case, the right to be free of an adverse inference from refusing to testify is generally limited to the criminal case itself. See City of Chicago v. Reliable Truck Parts Co. Inc., 768 F. Supp. 642, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991), citing Nat'l Accep. Co. of America v. Bathalter, 705 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983); Shea v. Civil Service Commission, 224 Ill. App. 3d 282, 586 N.E.2d 512, 516 (1st Dist. 1991).
In any case of this kind, the attorney representing the claimant in the UI case should consult with the criminal defense attorney and the affected client to decide on strategy given the seriousness of the offense charged, the likelihood of conviction and the relative costs associated with losing the UI benefits or the criminal case. Moreover, since the claimant will testify under oath at the UI hearing, his testimony may be used in his criminal case for impeachment, to show wrongdoing, or for other purposes. Also, in multiple claimant cases, potential conflicts may exist.
Pursuant to Section 601 of the Act 820 ILCS 405/601, unless the claimant falls within one of the enumerated exceptions (see Connected with Work) an individual is disqualified from receiving UI if he has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit until he has become reemployed and has had earnings equal to or in excess of his current weekly benefit amount in each of four calendar weeks.
The first issue in a voluntary leave case is whether the claimant left work or was discharged. This is largely a question of intent, and where the record contains no evidence that the claimant intended to abandon her position, courts have held that the claimant was discharged. Arroyo v. Doherty, 296 Ill. App. 3d 839,846 (1st Dist. 1998) (claimant’s mother contacted employer throughout her illness and claimant attempted to return to work after her recovery 6 weeks later). See also Grigoleit v. IDES, 282 Ill. App. 3d 64 (4th Dist. 1996), (claimant did not voluntarily leave where she thought that she was merely taking the day off without pay and made several attempts to be reinstated); 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(a) ("For an individual's separation from work to be a voluntary leaving, the individual must have the option to remain employed by the employing unit."). Similarly, termination of employment during an approved leave of absence where the employee tries to return to work is involuntary and attributable to the employer. Jones v. IDES, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141 (1st Dist. 1995).
When an employee is hired by a temporary staffing agency to perform work on a temporary basis, he has an affirmative duty to contact the temporary agency at the conclusion of the assignment for a subsequent placement; failure to do so may result in a finding that he has voluntarily left the employment. See Chicago Transit Authority v. Doherty, 291 Ill. App. 3d 909 (1st Dist. 1997); but see Calkins v. Bd. of Review, 141 Ill. App. 3d 36, 489 N.E.2d 920 (3d Dist. 1986); Jones v. IDES, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141 (1st Dist. 1995); Chicago Transit Authority v. Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 773, 659 N.E.2d 28 (1st Dist. 1995), (when a claimant knowingly accepts a temporary job and is then separated from that work when the agreed period of hire is over, he did not voluntarily leave merely by honoring the temporary employment agreement, unless he refused further work when it was offered).
The burden of proof in a voluntary leave claim is generally on the claimant. But, as is the case in misconduct cases, it can vary depending on the circumstances.
Sometimes an employer will describe a separation as voluntary leaving, especially in cases of "no-call, no-show," because it is to their advantage to have the claim decided under 601A. The courts have generally treated the issue of whether it was a discharge or quit as one of fact, emphasizing which party initiated the separation. It is nearly always to the claimant's advantage to argue that he was discharged.
Illinois courts have adopted the theory of "constructive voluntary leave," whereby the loss of employment is attributable to the claimant's own action or inaction and constitutes a voluntary leaving. See Horton v. Department of Employment Sec., 335 Ill. App. 3d 537, 781 N.E.2d 545 (1st Dist. 2002) (suspension of driver's license due to traffic citations held to constitute "constructive voluntary leaving"); Hawkins v. IDES, 268 Ill. App. 3d 927, 645 N.E.2d 428 (1994) (finding failure to obtain a commercial driver's license was due to claimant's inaction rather than inability to pass the test, since, although driver was aware of deadline for passing test two years before deadline occurred, he failed to take test until one week before the deadline and passed test on his third try one month after deadline). In addition, IDES has promulgated a rule acknowledging this doctrine. 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, when obtaining or maintaining a 'tool of the trade' necessary to perform a job, including but not limited to an occupational or other license required by federal or State law, is within an individual's control, a work separation that results from the individual's failure to obtain or maintain the tool of the trade is a voluntary leaving.").
This interpretation contradicts the IUIA because, in fact, the claimant did not quit and the statute does not speak of constructively quitting. Rather, in each case the claimant was discharged for certain conduct and the proper issue should be whether the claimant's acts constitute "misconduct." Thus, where the employer neglected to deduct union dues from a claimant's paycheck and because of her personal financial situation, the claimant could not pay the arrearage when the error was discovered, the claimant ought not be denied UI benefits. Pearson v. Bd. of Review, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 551 N.E.2d 1021 (1st Dist. 1990). In any event, the licensing situation should turn on whether the claimant deliberately refused to do what was required to become licensed, or tried, in good faith, to obtain the license but, for example, could not pass the exam. See Digest MC § 135.3, ABR-85-756/6-25-85. The regulation acknowledges this. See 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(a)(7) (citing, as an example, an individual who takes training courses as required to obtain necessary license but repeatedly fails the exam, as not voluntarily leaving employment).
Good cause to leave one's work is cause that results from circumstances that produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real and substantial, and which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the same manner. Burke v. Bd. of Review, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 477 N.E.2d 1351 (2d Dist. 1985). Whether an employee had good cause for leaving the job depends upon an employee's unique personal circumstances and reasonableness of employee's actions. Hawkins v. IDES, 268 Ill. App. 3d 927, 645 N.E.2d 248 ( 1st Dist. 1994). Thus, an action by the employer that places an additional substantial burden on the claimant may be good cause to leave. Jaime v. IDES, 301 Ill. App. 3d 930 (1st Dist. 1998) (employer relocation required claimant to commute an additional distance of 16 miles in each direction). When an employer requires an employee to perform tasks that she is untrained and unqualified to perform competently, she has good cause to quit. Davis v. Bd. of Review, 125 Ill. App. 3d 67 (1st Dist. 1984). Reduction in pay may also constitute good cause for leaving employment unless claimant resigned several months after the pay reduction went into effect and claimant made no efforts to resolve the situation with employer. Henderson v. IDES, 230 Ill. App. 3d 536, 595 N.E.2d 96 (1st Dist. 1992). Reduction in hours, however, has been held not to constitute good cause, where the claimant could keep the job with reduced hours and file a claim for partial benefits. Acevedo v. Department of Employment Sec., 324 Ill. App. 3d 768, 755 N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist. 2001). The regulations contain a list of examples to illustrate what constitutes "good cause." 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(b).
IDES has adopted a regulation governing "early retirement" or "employment buyout packages," under which an employee is deemed ineligible after accepting such an offer unless "1) the individual knows or reasonably believes that, within the proximate future, his employment will be terminated by the employer under terms and conditions substantially less favorable than the terms and conditions of the offer, or 2) the individual knows or reasonably believes that his employment will continue, in the proximate future, but under terms and conditions substantially less favorable than the terms and conditions of his employment immediately prior to the offer, or 3) the individual knows that a layoff will follow if a sufficient number of employees do not accept the offer of an early retirement or employment buyout package and the individual accepts the offer to avoid the layoff of another employee." 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.125(a). The regulation provides a non-exclusive list of examples of situations and whether they would fall within the rule. Id., § 2840.125(b)(1)-(8). See also Childress v. Department of Employment Sec., 405 Ill. App. 3d 939, 940 N.E.2d 90 (1st Dist. 2010).
A special (and confused) problem arises when a claimant leaves one job (usually a part-time position) after being laid off from another (usually full-time) job. By the language in the statute, if a claimant quits any job (absent good cause attributable to the employer or the application of one of the exceptions), he should be denied for the week in which he quit and all further weeks until he requalifies 19 . But in fact, if the circumstances of losing the full-time job are not otherwise disqualifying, the courts are split on whether the claimant should be affected in the receipt of benefits based on then leaving the part-time job. Compare Rodgers v. IDES, 186 Ill. App. 3d 194, 542 N.E.2d 168 (2d Dist. 1989); Butler v. Bd. of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 484 N.E.2d 328 (5th Dist. 1985); with Minfield v. Bernardi, 122 Ill. App. 3d 97, 460 N.E.2d 766 (1st Dist. 1984).
Since the claimant's cause to leave work must be "attributable to the employ[er]," the inquiry focuses on the employer's conduct, not the employee's. Henderson v. IDES, 230 Ill. App. 3d 536, 595 N.E.2d 96 (1st Dist. 1992); Grant v. Bd. of Review, 200 Ill. App. 3d 732, 558 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1st Dist. 1990); Pearson v. Bd. of Review, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 551 N.E.2d 1021 (1st Dist. 1990). And, whether the claimant's reason for leaving work constitutes "good cause attributable to the employer" is a question of fact. Grant, 558 N.E.2d at 440. The regulations contain a list of examples of what constitutes cause "attributable to the employer" (but not necessarily "good cause"). 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(c).
Note that the requirement that the good cause be attributable to the employing unit does not require that the employer's actions be unreasonable. Davis v. Bd. of Review, 125 Ill. App. 3d 67, 465 N.E.2d 576 (1st Dist. 1984); Grant, 558 N.E.2d at 440. For instance, a substantial unilateral change in employment may render a job unsuitable and prevent a disqualification based on voluntary leaving. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 580; Jones v. Bd. of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 64, 482 N.E.2d 1131 (2d Dist. 1985). In particular, a unilateral and substantial reduction in hourly wage rate or other benefits constitutes good cause to leave work. Keystone Steel v. IDOL, 37 Ill. App. 3d 704, 346 N.E.2d 399 (3d Dist. 1976); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. IDOL, 186 Ill. App. 3d 493, 542 N.E.2d 538 (2d Dist. 1989). But dissatisfaction with unchanged wages does not constitute good cause. Minfield v. Bernardi, 122 Ill. App. 3d 97, 460 N.E.2d 766 (1984); Butler v. Bd. of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 484 N.E.2d 318 (1985). And reduction of hours generally does not constitute good cause. Acevedo v. Department of Employment Sec., 324 Ill. App. 3d 768, 755 N.E.2d 93 (1st Dist. 2001); Collier v. IDES, 157 Ill. App. 3d 988, 510 N.E.2d 623 (1987); Popoff v. IDOL, 144 Ill. App. 3d 575, 494 N.E.2d 1266 (2d Dist. 1986).
The employer's conduct can be one of several reasons for the claimant's leaving. Pearson v. Board of Review, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 551 N.E.2d 1021 (1st Dist. 1990); Grant, 558 N.E.2d at 440. But the claimant must make reasonable efforts to resolve work related problems with the employer in order to establish good cause for voluntary leaving. Davis, 465 N.E.2d at 580; Henderson v. IDES, 230 Ill. App. 3d 536, 595 N.E.2d 96 (1992). The claimant need not exhaust all avenues of redress, however, and, in particular, need not exhaust a union grievance. Barron v. Ward, 165 Ill. App. 3d 653, 517 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1987).
If the assigned work jeopardizes the claimant's health, he has good cause to leave. Davis, 465 N.E.2d 576. But mere dissatisfaction with work conditions that cause the claimant added stress is not good cause if the employer has not changed the work conditions. To establish good cause based on ill health arising from the work, a claimant must (a) offer competent (usually medical) testimony that adequate health reasons existed to justify termination; (b) inform the employer of the health problem; and (c) accept any reasonable accommodation by the employer for other work (or other work conditions) that is not inimical to the claimant's health. Burke v. Bd. of Review, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 477 N.E.2d 1351 (2d Dist. 1985); Rogers v. IDES, 186 Ill. App. 3d 194, 542 N.E.2d 168 (2d Dist.1989); Finick v. IDES, 171 Ill. App. 3d 125, 524 N.E.2d 1148 (1st Dist. 1988); Eggleston v. IDES, 199 Ill. App. 3d 743, 557 N.E.2d 534 (1st Dist. 1990); Nichols v. IDES, 218 Ill. App. 3d 803, 578 N.E.2d 1121 (1st Dist. 1991).
The Act provides seven exceptions to the requirement that good cause be attributable to the employing unit. 820 ILCS 405/601.B.1-7.
A claimant is eligible if he quits because a health problem prevents him/her from performing his/her work or he is needed to care for spouse, child, or parent who is ill 20 . But the need for the claimant to stop work must be confirmed by advice from a licensed and practicing physician 21 . How particular the physician's advice has been unclear. Compare Jenkins v. Department of Employment Sec., 346 Ill. App. 3d 408, 805 N.E.2d 363 (1st Dist. 2004), and Flex v. IDOL, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 466 N.E.2d 1050 (1st Dist. 1984), with Dubinin v. Ward, 137 Ill. App. 3d 281, 484 N.E.2d 870 (1st Dist. 1985); Clark v. Bd. of Review, 131 Ill. App. 3d 317, 475 N.E.2d 942 (1st Dist. 1985); and Zbiegien v. IDOL, 156 Ill. App. 3d 395, 510 N.E.2d 422 (1st Dist. 1987). In 2009, the Illinois legislature clarified, however, that a physician may deem a family member disabled, but need not also specifically advise the claimant to leave his/her work to provide needed care. It also indicated that other reasonable evidence may verify the family member’s need for care. See Ill. Pub. Act 96-30, § 10 (June 30, 2009) (amending language in 820 ILCS 405/601.B.1 to read “because the individual's assistance is necessary for the purpose of caring for his or her spouse, child, or parent who, according to a licensed and practicing physician or as otherwise reasonably verified, is in poor physical or mental health or is mentally or physically disabled and the employer is unable to accommodate the individual's need to provide such assistance”). Note that leaving because of the birth of a healthy child (or failing to return after a maternity leave) is not attributable to the employer or among the listed exceptions. Grant v. Bd. of Review, 200 Ill. App. 3d 732, 558 N.E.2d 438 (1st Dist. 1990) 22 .
The statute used to require that the claimant have "notified his employing unit of the reasons for his absence" to invoke the exception for illness or family illness. See 820 ILCS 405/601.B.1. While this provision did not explicitly require that the claimant take a note from the doctor to the employer, one court interpreted it to do so. Finik v. IDES, 171 Ill. App. 3d 125, 524 N.E.2d 1148, 1155 n.1 (1st Dist. 1988). In 2009, the Illinois legislature deleted the language from that section of the statute. See Ill. Pub. Act 96-30, § 10 (June 30, 2009). (Notice requirements do apply when invoking the exception for domestic violence in 820 ILCS 405/601.B.6.) Of course, the "good cause" requirement of the IUIA has been interpreted to require an effort to resolve the issue with the employer when possible, a requirement that could create a duty at least to share the nature of the reason for leaving with the employer, even if the statute does not require the claimant to give documentation to the employer, in the event some accommodation could be made. See 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2840.101(b).
Note that the exceptions do not affect the requirement that the individual be able and available for work. Therefore, if he is unable to perform her old work, he must be able to perform other work for which he is trained and/or has experience and for which there is a market. And if he must care for a family member, the caretaking responsibilities cannot prevent him from accepting all work 23 . A claimant is eligible if he quits to accept other work and is either "not unemployed" in each of two weeks or earns twice his current weekly benefit amount. See Woodliff v. IDOL, 139 Ill. App. 3d 539, 487 N.E.2d 645 (2d Dist. 1985).
A claimant is eligible if he quits to accept other work and is either "not unemployed" in each of two weeks or earns twice his current weekly benefit amount. See Woodliff v. IDOL, 139 Ill. App. 3d 539, 487 N.E.2d 645 (1985). But see 56 Ill. Adm. Code 2840.101(c)(6) (stating that unless "higher management" was aware of supervisor's "abusive" conduct, employee who quits due to supervisor's abusive conduct has not quit for cause "attributable to employer").
A claimant is eligible if he quits because of sexual harassment by another employee when the employer had knowledge. (Sexual harassment by a supervisory employee is not covered by this provision because any such circumstance would presumably give the claimant good cause for leaving attributable to the employer.)
A claimant is eligible if he quits to avoid bumping another employee under the terms of a labor contact or established employer plan.
Pursuant to Section 603 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/603), a claimant is disqualified from further receipt of benefits (until he earns at least four times his/her WBA) if, while he is claiming benefits, he fails, without good cause, either to apply for available, suitable work when so directed by the job service or to accept suitable work when offered by the job service or an employer.
Thompson v. IDOL, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 457 N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1983) contains a thorough discussion of what constitutes good cause for failing to apply for suitable work. See also Lester v. Department of Employment Sec., 354 Ill. App. 3d 51, 819 N.E.2d 1143 (1st Dist. 2004) (finding lack of good cause for failing to accept suitable work). The concept is very much like good cause for leaving a job. See Chicago Transit Authority v. Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d, 659 N.E.2d 28 (1st Dist. 1995). Indeed, refusal issues can be thought of as involving work search concepts (since both refusal of a job and failure to look for one indicate a lack of attachment to the workforce), and voluntary leave concepts (since whether refusing or leaving a job is disqualifying often turns on whether the claimant had "good cause" for not doing that work or whether the work in question was "suitable").
Section 603 says that "[i]n determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, consideration shall be given to the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience, and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence." 820 ILCS 405/603.
The longer a claimant is out of work the more willing he must be to change jobs, travel farther and accept lower pay. Doyle v. Bd. of Review, 31 Ill. App. 3d 968, 970, 334 N.E.2d 776 (4th Dist. 1975). Whether a skilled worker must accept unskilled work turns on particular facts such as the length of the claimant's unemployment, the amount of reduction of wages and other benefits and the job market available to the claimant. Compare, Behling v. IDOL, 171 Ill. App. 3d 804, 525 N.E.2d 1021 (1st Dist. 1988); Komarec v. IDOL 144 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 494 N.E.2d 1257 (1986); Eddings v. IDOL, 146 Ill. App. 3d 62, 496 N.E.2d 1167 (2nd Dist. 1986); and Mangan v. Bernardi, 131 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 477 N.E.2d 13 (1st Dist. 1985) with Lester v. Department of Employment Sec., 354 Ill. App. 3d 51, 819 N.E.2d 1143 (1st Dist. 2004) and Jones v. IDOL, 140 Ill. App. 3d 699, 489 N.E.2d 325 (1986). But the mere fact that the work offered is a demotion or that there is no chance of advancement does not render the job unsuitable. Perkins v. Bd. of Review, 137 Ill. App. 3d 892, 485 N.E.2d 575 (2d Dist. 1985).
A job may be unsuitable for a particular person because of his/her moral or religious beliefs. See e.g., Frazee v. IDES, 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
A claimant must not only accept, but also apply for suitable work. Failure to apply for one job because of circumstances such as distance or transportation difficulties give the claimant good cause for rejecting that opportunity is not disqualifying. Thompson v. Bd. of Review, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1, 457, N.E.2d 512 (2d Dist. 1983).
Section 603 says that "benefits shall not be denied under this Act to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work . [if]:
the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization; [or]
the position offered is a transfer to other work offered to the individual by the employing unit under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or pursuant to an established employer plan, program, or policy, when the acceptance of such other work by the individual would require the separation from that work of another individual currently performing it." 820 ILCS 405/603.
Pursuant to Section 604 of the IUIA 820 ILCS 405/604, an individual is ineligible for UI for any week in which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute where he was last employed, unless the claimant shows that he: (a) is not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute; and (b) does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which are participating in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute.Pursuant to Section 604 of the IUIA 820 ILCS 405/604, an individual is ineligible for UI for any week in which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute where he was last employed, unless the claimant shows that he: (a) is not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute; and (b) does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which are participating in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute.
Three initial elements must all be met to cause ineligibility under Section 604: existence of work stoppage, existence of labor dispute, and proximate causation between labor dispute and work stoppage. Central Foundry Division of G. M. Corp. v. Holland, 36 Ill. App. 3d 998, 345 N.E.2d 143 (1976); Dunaway v. IDOL, 99 Ill. 2d 417, 459 N.E.2d. 1332 (1984); Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1996).
Work stoppage: A "work stoppage" exists where because of a labor dispute, the company's business operations are substantially curtailed. Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1996) (work stoppage existed where employees did not work at all during dispute, employer did not hire replacements, and some of their work did not get done). A work stoppage includes not only a strike but a "slow down" by the workers which reduces production and therefore causes employees to be laid off or to have their work hours reduced. Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381 (1950); Bankston Creek Collieries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E.2d 670 (1948).
A work stoppage is not over until the employer's business operations return to substantially normal operations. Travis v. Grabiec, 52 Ill. 2d 175, 287 N.E.2d 468 (1972); Boone v. IDOL, 144 Ill. App. 3d 306, 495 N.E.2d 66 (5th Dist. 1986); Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (1996). Normal operations means not merely that the company maintains full production, but that it did so with the normal number of workers working normal hours. Boone, 495 N.E.2d 66. Thus, the fact that a skeleton management workforce working overtime maintains full production does not mean there is no work stoppage. Id. However, "[p]roduction levels do not have to return exactly to prestrike levels before an employer reaches 'substantially normal business operations.'" Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Doherty, 305 Ill. App. 3d 141, 148, 711 N.E.2d 799 (4th Dist. 1999); see also 520 South Michigan Ave. Associates v. Department of Employment Sec., 404 Ill. App. 3d 304, 935 N.E.2d 612 (1st Dist. 2010), appeal denied, 239 Ill. 2d 552, 943 N.E.2d 1100 (2011).
In addition, "[a]n individual's total or partial unemployment resulting from any reduction in operations or reduction of force or layoff of employees by an employer made in the course of or in anticipation of collective bargaining negotiations between a labor organization and such employer, is not due to a stoppage of work which exits because of a labor dispute until the date of actual commencement of a strike or lockout." 820 ILCS 405/604.
Labor dispute: A labor dispute is "any controversy concerning wages, hours, working conditions or terms of employment." Buchholz v. Cummins, 6 Ill. 2d 382, 128 N.E.2d 900 (1955); Local Union No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 299, 71 N.E. 2d 637, 640 (1947); Central Foundry Division v. Holland, 36 Ill. App. 3d 998, 345 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1976); Be-Mac Transport Co. v. Grabiec, 20 Ill. App. 3d 345, 314 N.E.2d 242 (1st Dist. 1974); Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1996). Once contract negotiations begin, it is generally presumed that a labor dispute exists. Ross v. IDES, 201 Ill. App. 3d 474, 559 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1st Dist. 1990). If a contract has expired and employees and employer have not agreed to a new contract, a "labor dispute" exists. Golab, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108. Neither reasonableness of demands nor merits of dispute are material to determining whether a "labor dispute" exists. Id.
A "labor dispute" does not include an individual's refusal to work because of his employer's failure to pay accrued earned wages within 10 working days from the date due, or to pay any other uncontested accrued obligation arising out of his employment within 10 days from the date due." 820 ILCS 405/604 overruling Local 7-641, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, Intern. Union v. IDOL, 96 Ill. 2d 94, 449 N.E.2d 134 (1983).
A "labor dispute" includes lockouts as well as strikes unless certain statutory exceptions apply. Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1996). A "labor dispute" does not include "a lockout by an employer for any week during which (1) the employer refuses to meet under reasonable conditions with the recognized or certified collective bargaining representative of the locked out employees to discuss the issues giving rise to the lockout or (2) there is a final adjudication under the National Labor Relations Act that during the period of the lockout the employer has refused to bargain in good faith with the recognized or certified collective bargaining representative of the locked-out employees over issues giving rise to the lockout, or (3) the lockout violates the provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement." 820 ILCS 405/604.
Causation: For Section 604 to render a claimant ineligible, the claimant's unemployment must be caused by a labor dispute at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed. Central Foundry Division of G.M. Corp. v. Holland, 36 Ill. App. 3d 998, 345 N.E.2d 143, 147 (4th Dist. 1976). If work stoppage results from disagreement over the terms of a new contract, causal relation exists between labor dispute and work stoppage. Golab v. IDES, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 666 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1996). Causation is a factual issue, usually having to do with whether the labor dispute is at the claimant's "factory, establishment or premises." Id. Thus, if claimants are laid off from one plant or company because of a drop in sales to, or orders from, another plant or company in which a strike is occurring, their unemployment is not causally connected to a labor dispute "at the factory, establishment or other premises at which [the claimant] is or was last employed." See Central Foundry, 345 N.E.2d at 147-48; Dunaway v. IDOL, 99 Ill. 2d 417, 459 N.E.2d. 1332, 1335-36 (1984).
If separate branches of work which are commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises are conducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such department shall . be deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises. 820 ILCS 405/604.
Even if the three elements are met, a claimant is not ineligible if he shows both that he is not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute, and that he does not (or did not just before the work stoppage began) belong to a grade or class of workers which are participating in, financing or directly interested in the dispute. See, Local No. 658 v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1949); Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. App. 3d 384, 91 N.E.2d 381, 386 (1950); Shell Oil Company v. Cummins, 7 Ill. App. 2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1956). International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 828 N.E.2d 1104 (2005).
"[A]n individual's failure to cross a picket line. shall not, in itself, be deemed to be participation in the labor dispute." 820 ILCS 405/604; see Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Bowling, 95 Ill. 2d 397, 447 N.E.2d 1324 (1983); Wyman-Gordon Co. v. Bernardi, 135 Ill. App. 3d 685, 481 N.E.2d 1285 (1st Dist. 1985). But failure to cross the picket line plus receipt of strike benefits does constitute "participation." Highway Drivers v. Ward, 201 Ill. App. 3d 534, 559 N.E.2d 158 (1st Dist. 1990).
A claimant is not necessarily financing a strike merely because her union pays into the same fund into which the striking union also pays even if the fund is used for strike benefits, so long as the claimant had no choice but to pay into the fund and the effect of the fund on the dispute is insignificant. Outboard Marine and Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E.2d 610, 618 (1949); General Motors Corp. v. Bowling, 85 Ill. 2d 539, 426 N.E.2d 1200, 1212-13 (1981). But a presumption arises that the claimant is financing the strike if the payments are increased during the strike or the claimant's contributions to the fund are used for strike benefits.
Nor are members of one union "directly interested in" the dispute if the pay or other work conditions are not at issue in their dispute. Outboard Marine, 87 N.E.2d at 617. But if work conditions such as the rate of pay of the claimants will be affected by the resolution of the dispute, then the claimants are "directly interested" in the dispute. Local No. 658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625 629 (1949); see also International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148, AFL-CIO v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 828 N.E.2d 1104 (2005). The fact that the striking union's contract has been used in the past as a model for the claimant's union does not make the claimants "directly interested" in the dispute so long as there is no assurance that the terms of the striking union's contract will be so used in the future. General Motors Corp., 426 N.E.2d at 1212. Indeed even if the employer pays all workers the same wage increase in settling a dispute with some workers, the others do not thereby become directly interested in the dispute. Shell Oil Company v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64, 68 (1956).
The determination of whether employees are in the same "grade or class" of workers is determined by reference to the duties the groups perform and whether they are both covered by the same union contract or not. See Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381, 386 (1950). Thus, office workers who are members of one union covered by one contract are not in the same grade or class as production and maintenance workers in a different union with a different contract. Outboard Marine and Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E.2d 610, 619 (1949). And it does not matter that the different unions customarily negotiate together with the employer and have the resulting contracts embodied in the same document so long as each union is free independently to accept or reject the contract. Shell Oil Company v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64, 68 (1956). But production and maintenance workers are members of the same grade or class of union workers if either they are all in one union with one contract doing work related to the same manufacturing process even though they do somewhat different work, Brown Shoe Co., 91 N.E.2d at 386; Local No. 658, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Co., 403 Ill. 484, 87 N.E.2d 625 (1949), or if they had the same duties even if only one of the two groups is unionized. Boone v. IDOL, 144 Ill. App. 3d 306, 495 N.E.2d 66 (1986).
If a claimant is out of work due to a labor dispute, he generally cannot be ineligible for misconduct or voluntary leaving. Shell Oil Company v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64, 69 (1956); County of Cook v. IDOL, 123 Ill. App. 3d 68, 462 N.E.2d 576 (1st Dist. 1984).
Receipt of certain types of income disqualifies a claimant for unemployment insurance benefits or reduces the amount of the benefits. IDES's regulations on disqualifying income are at 56 Ill. Adm. Code § 2920 and the relevant statutory provisions are at 820 ILCS 405/234, 820 ILCS 405/235 (Wages), 820 ILCS 405/239 (Unemployed Individual), 820 ILCS 405/401 (Weekly Benefit Amount, Dependents' Allowances), 820 ILCS 405/402 (Reduced Weekly Benefits), 820 ILCS 405/605 (Receipt of Unemployment Benefits Under Another Law), 820 ILCS 405/606 (Receipt of Worker's Compensation), 820 ILCS 405/610 (Vacation Pay), 820 ILCS 405/611 (Retirement Pay).
With two exceptions, it serves little purpose to parse the rules here since they involve definitions as to each type of pay, and a description of whether, when, how much of any such income (as compared to a claimants' WBA) disqualifies or reduces benefits (and if it reduces, by how much), and whether you can aggregate. These issues arise infrequently and it is easier to work through the regulations for each form of income when a particular case arises.
The forms of income which can lead to disqualification are: